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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2)0)(Rep.Vol. 9 2002).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the Court below properly conclude that plaintiff had no right of action

to seek to enforce a provision of the Workers' Compensation Act in the District Court?
2.

Did the Court below properly determine that the plaintiff failed to state an

actionable claim for unjust enrichment?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff brought this action alleging that the defendants were liable to it for
benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act for the reasonable value of prescriptions
provided to injured employees of the employer defendants. It alleged that it had paid for
such prescriptions which were obligations of the defendant employers or the Workers'
Compensation Fund (WCF). The Court below granted the defendants' motion to dismiss
on the ground that courts have no jurisdiction over claims arising under the Workers'
Compensation Act.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
There is no private right of action under the Workers' Compensation Act and the
Utah Supreme Court has expressly held that district courts have no jurisdiction
whatsoever to hear claims arising under the Act.

1

Plaintiffs complaint failed to state a claim for unjust enrichment because such a
claim, as against the defendant employers, is barred by the exclusive remedy provision of
the Workers' Compensation Act and as against the WCF the complaint failed to allege
any facts which would entitle it to relief.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.

THERE IS NO PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION UNDER THE
WORKERS1 COMPENSATION ACT PROVISION FOR WHICH
PLAINTIFF CLAIMS AN ENTITLEMENT.

There is no private right of action to enforce the provisions of Utah Code Ann.
§34A-2-418 (Rep.Vol. 4B 2005). The Utah Supreme Court has articulated a four part test
to provide guidance in determining if statutory enactments confer private rights of action,
which test was first adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S.
66 (1975). In Machan v. UNUM Life Ins. Co., of America. 116 P.3d 342 (Utah 2005),
the Court set forth the test as follows:
(1) whether the plaintiff is a member of a class for whose
special benefit the statute was enacted; (2) whether [the
legislature] intended to create or deny a private remedy; (3)
whether a private remedy would be consistent with the
statute's underlying purposes; (4) the extent to which the
cause of action is traditionally relegated to state law.
116P.3dat347.
Additionally, the Court noted that
in the absence of statutory language expressly indicating a
legislative intent to grant a private right of action, Utah courts
are reluctant to recognize an implied right.
2

i d at 348.
In the present case the plaintiff satisfies none of the factors supporting a private
right of action. It is axiomatic that the class of people sought to be benefitted by the
Workers' Compensation Act are the working men and women of the state, not a pharmacy
collection agency.
The purposes which underlies the Workers' Compensation
Act are: to assure to the injured employee and his dependents
an income during the period of his total disability and to
provide compensation for any resulting permanent disability;
to accomplish this by a simple and speedy procedure which
eliminates the expense, delay and uncertainty in having to
prove negligence on the part of the employer; and to thus
require industry to bear the burden of the injuries suffered in
it.
Wilstead v. Industrial Commission. 407 P.2d 692, 693 (Utah 1965).
The Workers' Compensation Act was not enacted to give assignees of pharmacies
a cause of action for resolving disputes regarding the reasonableness of prescription
billings.
Perhaps even more fatal to plaintiffs position is the fact that the Workers'
Compensation Act not only doesn't expressly create a private cause of action for its
enforcement, it creates an administrative remedy which is, as against employers, the
exclusive remedy for any claim arising from an injury to an employee. Utah Code Ann.
§34A-2-105 (Rep.Vol. 4B 2005) provides, in relevant part, that the
right to recover compensation pursuant to this chapter for
injuries sustained by an employee, whether resulting in death
3

or not, shall be the exclusive remedy against the employer and
shall be the exclusive remedy against any officer, agent, or
employee of the employer and the liabilities of the employer
imposed by this chapter shall be in place of any and all other
civil liability whatsoever, at common law or otherwise, to the
employee or to the employee's spouse, widow, children,
parents, dependents, next of kin, heirs, personal
representatives, guardian, or any other person whomsoever,
on account of any accident or injury or death, in any way
contracted, sustained, aggravated, or incurred by the employee
in the course of or because of or arising out of the employee's
employment, and no action at law may be maintained against
an employer or against any officer, agent, or employee of the
employer based upon any accident, injury, or death of an
employee.
(emphasis added).
Not only does the Act not authorize civil court actions to enforce its provisions, it
creates a comprehensive administrative procedure for its enforcement. See Utah Code
Ann. §34A-2-801, et se£. (Rep.Vol. 4B 2005). As was noted in Sauers v. Salt Lake
County, 735 F.Supp. 381 (D.Utah 1990), if a statute purporting to create rights or impose
duties contains an exclusive administrative remedy, then a civil action for the alleged
violation of those rights or duties is barred.
As a civil action is wholly inconsistent with the Workers' Compensation Act's
underlying purpose, plaintiffs fail the third prong of the Cort v. Ash test. The final
portion of the test is also failed because disputes about matters governed by the Workers'
Compensation Act have historically been resolved through administrative, and not
judicial, processes.
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Defendants are aware of no case where Utah's courts have implied a private right
of action pursuant to a statute that did not expressly provide for one but are aware of
numerous cases wherein the courts have refused to find such a right. See, for example,
Huckner v. Kennard. 99 P.3d 842 (Utah 2004); Miller v. Weaver, 66 P.3d 592 (Utah
2003); Young v. Salt Lake Citv School District, 52 P.3d 1230 (Utah 2002); and
Broadbent v. Cache County School District Board of Education, 910 P.2d 1274 (Utah
App. 1996).
In Broadbent, supra, this Court reiterated what is the overriding theme of the Utah
cases rejecting contentions that Utah statutes impliedly created private rights of action:
"the courts of this state are not generally in the habit of implying a private right of action
based upon state law, absent some specific direction from the Legislature." 910 P.2d at
1278.
The plaintiffs argument regarding its purported right to enforce the provisions of
Utah's Workers' Compensation Act in the courts of this state fails to address the primary
issue posed by the courts when analyzing a claim to a private right of action: did the
legislature intend such an action be available?
In the absence of language expressly granting a private right
of action in the statute itself, the courts of this state are
reluctant to imply a right of action based on state law. This
reluctance is particularly strong when the legislature has
already designated a method of resolution through an
administrative agency . . .
Miller v. Weaver, 66 P.3d 592, 598-99 (Utah 2003) (citations omitted).
5

The legislature has established that the Labor Commission is the forum for
enforcement of the Workers' Compensation Act and that the right to recover
compensation in that forum "shall be in place of any and all other civil liability
whatsoever, at common law or otherwise . . . ." Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-105(1) (Rep.
Vol. 4B 2005).
The mere fact that a statute imposes legal duties does not mean that those duties
give rise to a right of action in court to enforce compliance with the statute. .See, e.g.,
Youren v. Tintic School District 86 P.3d 771 (Utah App. 2004); Milliner v. Elner Fox &
Ca, 529 P.2d 806 (Utah 1974).
Plaintiff has cited no authority in support of its argument that the Workers'
Compensation Act creates a private right of action for its enforcement in a court and there
is none.
Lest there be any question on this point, the Utah Supreme Court has specifically
held that Courts cannot consider claims arising under the Workers' Compensation Act. In
Sheppick v. Albertson's. Inc.. 922 P.2d 769 (Utah 1996), the Court made clear that
[ajlthough the Act does not specifically state that no Court
may award benefits provided by the Act, that is its clear
import. District courts have no jurisdiction whatsoever over
cases that fall within the purview of the Workers'
Compensation Act.
922 P.2d at 773 (emphasis added).
Plaintiffs reliance on IHC v. Industrial Commission. 657 P.2d 1289 (Utah 1982),
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is completely misplaced for two reasons. First, that case did not involve an attempt to
enforce the provisions of the Act but rather was an action by a health care provider
seeking a declaratory judgment that the Industrial Commission had no power to regulate
the fees charged by hospitals for services provided to patients in actions by providers
against patients.
Second, the holding of the IHC case was changed by statute when the Legislature
specifically deprived health care providers of the right to seek payment for medical
services from injured workers. The present version of this statute is as follows:
The responsibility for compensation and the payment of
medical, nursing, and hospital services and medicines, and
funeral expenses provided under this chapter shall be:
(a) on the employer and the employer's insurance
carrier; and
(b) not on the employee.
Utah Code Ann. §34-A-401(2) (Rep.Vol. 4B 2005).
The plaintiffs allegation that the defendants owe it duties pursuant to a provision
of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted by a Court.
POINT II.

PLAINTIFF HAS NO CLAIM FOR UNJUST ENRICHMENT.

Working RX, Inc.'s second asserted cause of action sought recovery of money it
paid to the pharmacies, under the theory of unjust enrichment. Such a theory is
unavailable to a plaintiff who has voluntarily paid an obligation it did not owe. The law
is clear that a "person who voluntarily and officiously pays another's debts is not entitled
7

to reimbursement." Estate of Cleveland v. Gorden, 837 S.W.2d 68, 70 (Tenn.App. 1992).
An equitable claim for unjust enrichment is simply not available to one who voluntarily
pays the debt of someone else because "equity will not aid a volunteer." Farm Bureau
Mutual Auto Ins. Co. v. Buckeye Casualty Co.. 67 N.E.2d 906, 911 (Ohio 1946). As
stated by the Court in Chinchurreta v. Evergreen Management, Inc., 790 P.2d 372 (Id.
App. 1989),
It is well settled that a person cannot - by way of set-off,
counterclaim or direct action- recover money which he or she
"has voluntarily paid with full knowledge of all the facts, and
without fraud, duress or extortion, although no obligation to
make such payment existed." This rule, which at first blush
seems harsh, exists to protect persons who have had
unsolicited "benefits" thrust upon them.
790 P.2d at 374 (citations omitted).
As stated in the Restatement of Restitution §2 (1937), "A person who officiously
confers a benefit upon another is not entitled to restitution therefor."
As noted by the Alabama Supreme Court,
claims based on breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and
money had and received are precluded by proof that the
plaintiff voluntarily paid what he or she is seeking to recover.
Stone v. Mellon Mortgage Co., 771 S.2d 451, 456 (Ala. 2000).
Utah law has long recognized that a mere volunteer who pays the debt of another
does not thereby acquire an equitable claim for reimbursement. As noted in Bingham v.
Walker Bros., 283 P. 1055, 1064 (Utah 1929), the equitable
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doctrine of subrogation is not applied for the mere stranger or
volunteer, who has paid the debt of another, without any
assignment or agreement for subrogation, being under no
legal obligation to make payment, and not being compelled to
do so for the preservation of any rights in property of his own.
As stated more recently by this Court,
[t]he rule is well settled that a person cannot recover back
money which he has voluntarily paid with full knowledge of
all of the facts, without fraud, duress, or extortion in some
form.
Southern Title Guar. Co. v. Bethers. 761 P.2d 951, 955 (Utah App. 1988) (citations
omitted).
In Bethers, this Court also noted that
[t]he mere fact that a third person benefits from a contract
between two others does not make such third person liable in
quasi-contract, unjust enrichment, or restitution. There must
be some misleading act, request for services, or the like, to
support an action.
Id. at 954.
Clearly, the plaintiff has no equitable claim by virtue of having paid a bill
allegedly owed by the defendants. If, however, plaintiff is actually claiming to be seeking
to enforce the legal rights of the assignor pharmacy, then its claim is barred because the
pharmacy has no legal rights against the defendants which are enforceable in the courts
for the reasons set forth in Point I. above.
The out of state cases cited by the plaintiff have no application to the instant
action. They deal with the obligation of an HMO to pay the reasonable value of
9

emergency services for its medicaid eligible members whose providers are required, by
federal law, to give treatment. The defendants' obligations to the providers in these cases
were established by their contracts with the State or by statute. They did not arise under a
statute containing an exclusive remedy provision and did not involve services provided by
a volunteer.
In the instant case, arising under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act, it is
manifest that, as against the defendant employers, the obligations of the employers are
defined by the Act and such obligations "shall be in place of any and all other civil
liability whatsoever, at common law or otherwise, to . . . any other person whomsoever . .
." Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-105(l) (Rep.Vol. 4B 1995). This provision expressly prohibits
any allegedly "equitable" relief against the employers.
With regard to the defendant WCF, plaintiff hasn't alleged any purported benefit
which has been conferred upon the Fund. The WCF owes no contractual or common law
duties to the employees of its insured employers. Savage v. Educators Ins. Co., 908 P.2d
862, 866 (Utah 1995). Accordingly, the provision of services to injured employees does
not relieve the WCF of any contractual or common law duty it would otherwise owe to
the injured workers.
To the extent that the pharmacy would have a statutory claim against the Fund
arising under the Workers' Compensation Act, such a claim is within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Labor Commission. As the Utah Supreme Court has expressly held,
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"District Courts have no jurisdiction whatsoever over cases that fall within the purview of
the Workers' Compensation Act." Sheppick v. Albertson's. Inc., 922 P.2d 769, 773 (Utah
1996) (emphasis added).
Plaintiff attempts to assert that despite this unambiguous language, it must have a
claim at law because, otherwise, the pharmacy would have no rights to pursue a claim in
the Labor Commission. This assertion is both inaccurate and irrelevant.
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §34A-1-105(1) (Rep.Vol. 4B 2005), the Labor
Commission is vested with rule making authority. Utah Code Ann. §34A-1-304
(Rep.Vol. 4B 2005) gives the Commission explicit authority to make rules "governing
adjudicative procedures . . . " The Commission has exercised this authority in adopting
the procedure whereby a pharmacy could have its claim for prescription fees resolved.
Rule R612-2-24 of the Utah Administrative Code (2005) provides the legal remedy for
resolving disputes about medical payment. The Rule provides as follows:
A. Health care providers and payors are primarily responsible
to resolve disputes over fees for medical services between
themselves. However, in some cases it is necessary to submit
such disputes to the Division for resolution. The Commission
therefore establishes the following procedure for submission
and review of fees for medical services.
1. The provider shall submit a bill for services rendered, with
supporting documentation, to the payor within one year of the
date of service;
2. The payor shall evaluate the bill according to the
guidelines contained in the Commission's Medical Fee
Guidelines and RBRVS and shall pay the provider the
appropriate fee within 45 days as required by Rule R612-213.
11

3. If the provider believes that the payor has improperly
computed the fee under the RBRVS, the provider or designee
shall request the payor to reevaluate the fee. The provider's
request for re-evaluation shall be in writing, shall describe the
specific areas of disagreement and shall include all
appropriate documentation. The provider shall submit all
requests for re-evaluation to the payor within one year of the
date of the original payment.
4. Within 30 days of receipt of the written request for
revaluation, the payor shall either pay the additional fee due
the provider or respond with a specific written explanation of
the basis for its denial of additional fees. The payor shall
maintain proof of transmittal of its response.
B. If the provider continues to disagree with the payor's
determination of the appropriate fee, the provider shall submit
the matter to the Division by filing with the Division a written
explanation of the disagreement. The provider's explanation
shall include copies of:
1. The provider's original bill and supporting documentation;
2. The payor's initial payment of that bill;
3. The provider's request for re-evaluation and supporting
documentation; and
4. The payor's written explanation or its denial of additional
fees.
C. The Division will evaluate the dispute according to the
requirements of the Medical Fee Guidelines and RBRVS and,
if necessary, by consulting with the provider, payor, or
medical specialists. Within 45 days from the date the
Division receives the provider's request, the Division will
mail its determination to both parties.
D. Any party aggrieved by the Division's determination may
file an application for hearing with the Division of
Adjudication to obtain formal adjudication of the dispute.
E. A payor seeking reimbursement from a provider for
overpayment of a bill shall submit a written request to the
provider detailing the circumstances of the payment requested
within one year of submission of the bill.
1. Providers should make appropriate reimbursements, or
respond in writing detailing the reasons why repayment will
not be made, within 90 days or receipt of a written request
12

from a payor.
2. If a dispute as to reimbursement occurs, an aggrieved party
may request resolution of the dispute by the Labor
Commission.
This is the legal mechanism by which a pharmacy's claim can be resolved in the
Commission.
Plaintiff claims, however, that this Rule is beyond the delegated authority of the
Labor Commission. It is not, but even if plaintiff s assignor wasn't afforded a remedy in
the Commission, this fact wouldn't change the result in this case. The Utah Supreme
Court has expressly held that the exclusive remedy of the Workers' Compensation Act
bars civil actions in court even if the party filing such actions has no remedy in the Labor
Commission.
For example, in Morill v. J.M Constr. Co., 635 P.2d 88 (Utah 1981), our Supreme
Court held that the heir of a deceased worker could not maintain a wrongful death action
even though that heir was not a dependent of the worker and, therefore, had no rights
under the Workers' Compensation Act which could be asserted in the Commission.
The plaintiffs attempt to characterize its second claim against the defendant WCF
as an unjust enrichment claim is nothing more than an effort to enforce the provisions of
the Workers' Compensation Act in court, which it cannot do.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs attempt to enforce the Workers' Compensation Act in the District Court
was properly dismissed as there is no jurisdiction in the courts for such an action.
13

Plaintiffs claim for unjust enrichment against the defendant employers is barred by the
exclusive remedy provision of the Workers' Compensation Act, which is in lieu of all
other civil liability whatsoever. Plaintiffs claim for unjust enrichment as against the
Workers' Compensation Fund fails to allege any facts giving rise to an equitable
entitlement as against the Fund and, accordingly, the order of the District Court should be
affirmed.
DATED this jH^L day of May, 2007.
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER

By />».
M. David/Eckersley
Attorney for Workers' Compensation Fund
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